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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
route marker ("N.L. 13 L-R")." 1 The Court held (5-2) that there was no negli-
gence on the part of the state contributing to the accident.
The decision of the Court is confusing as to whether it is based upon the
absence of negligence or the absence of causation. The Court held that had the
driver paid attention to the physical characteristics of the road and the signs
thereon she would have had "adequate" warning of the existence of the inter-
section. Inasmuch as the driver did not concern herself with these physical
characteristics nor with the information the route marker was designed to con-
vey, the majority felt that it could not be assumed that she would h .ve paid more
attention to a full "stop" sign had it been there.
The Court's reasoning on the question of causality appears faulty in that it
seems to assume a factual conclusion inconsistent with negligence on the part
of the state. If existing warnings were adequate, so as to require more caution
on the part of the driver, then the state was under no duty to maintain a "stop"
sign. And without negligence, a discussion of causality is irrelevant. Therefore it
is submitted that the decision must rest entirely upon the absence of negligence.
The position of the dissent was that the physical characteristics of the in-
tersection were an inadequate warning and the state therefore was negligent in
retmoving the "stop" sign. As to causality, the dissent relied upon a presumption
that a "stop" sign, had it been there, would have been obeyed5
2
Statutory Ltability Without Fault - Per Curiam
In Smulczeski v. City Center of Music and Drama,53 the defendant was
charged with violation of a city ordinance which provided, "Every portion of any
special occupancy structure devoted to the use or accommodation of the pub
lic... shall be properly lighted during every performance.. ." Plaintiff allegedly
tripped on a stairway because an overhead light was out. On appeal a lower
court verdict for the defendant was reversed on the ground that the instructions
to the jury contained an erroneous charge upon a material point. The Court held
that the defendant was not entitled to notiee of its violation and that a charge
contrary to this was not cured by a subsequent charge instructing the jury that
the duty imposed on the defendant by the ordinance was absolute.
The per curiam opinion appears inconsistent, both internally and with respect
to precedent. The traditional New York doctrine is that violation of a local ordin-
ance is only some evidence, to be considered along with other evidence, on the
51. See N. Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT §8.
52. Lahr v. Tirrill, 247 N.Y. 112, 8 N.E.2d 298 (1-937); Lee v. City Brewing
Corp., 279 N.Y. 380, 18 N.E.2d 628 (1939).
53. 3 N.Y.2d 498, 169 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
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question of defendant's negligence.5 4 (Violation of a statute, however, may in
itself give rise to liability, either "a liability created by a statute or a liability for
negligence for which the statute creates a new standard or norm", the latter known
as negligence per se.55) The Court stated this rule but also spoke of the ordinance
as imposing an "absolute duty", and its refusal to allow the defendant any notice
of the defective lighting seems inconsistent with a mere evidence-of-negligence
effect of the ordinance. Previous decisions have considered notice, actual or con-
structive, essential to liability in cases involving violation of an ordinance56 and
even a statute.5 7 Thus the present case seems to involve a departure from the
New York rule that violation of an ordinance may be only evidence of negligence.
Duty of Property Owner to Licensee
A social guest, who is on another's premises pursuant to an invitation, is not
in law an invitee but rather a licensee to whom the possessor owes no duty of in-
spection and affirmative care to make the premises safe for his visit.58 The same
rule applies where the social guest is an infant.59 There is an obligation, how-
ever, on the part of the possessor, to disclose to the licensee any concealed
dangerous defects.60
The above principles were again approved by the Court of Appeals in
Krause v. Alper,61 which was a suit by the father of a boy who was injured while
playing basketball with the defendants' son on the defendants' premises. Since the
wooden doorstop, over which the infant had tripped, was in plain sight, there was
no "hidden pitfall" which could have imposed the duty of disclosure on the de-
fendants.
Duty of Employer to Provide Safe Premises for Employees
In Zucchelli v. City Construction Co.6 2 thirteen injured employees of the
R. E. Carrick Co. (subcontractor) brought an action against the 981 Madison
54. Teller v. Prospect Heights Hospital, 280 N.Y. 456, 21 N.E.2d 504 (1939);
Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N.Y. 345, 197 N.E. 306 (1935); Fluker
v. Ziegele Brewing Co., 201 N.Y. 40, 93 N.E. 1112 (1911). But see Silverman v.
Konig, 170 N.Y. Supp. 368 (Sup.Ct. 1918).
55. Schmidt v. Merchant's Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 303, 200 N.E.
804, 829 (1936). See also Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
56. Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., supra note 54; cf. 1 SHEARMAN AND
REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE §21 (rev. ed. 1941).
57. Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922); Schaeffer v. Caldwell,
273 App. Div. 263, 78 N.Y.S.2d 652 (4th Dep't 1948).
58. Wilder v. Ayers, 2 A.D.2d 354, 156 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1st Dep't 1956),aff'd
3 N.Y.2d 725, 163 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1957); PROSSER, TORTS §77 (2d ed., 1955).
59. Droge v. Czarniechi, 285 App. Div. 1052, 139 N.Y.S.2d 314 (2d Dep't
1955), aff'd 2 N.Y.2d 897, 161 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1957).
60. Bernal v. Baptist Fresh Air Home Society, 275 App. Div. 88, 96, 87
N.Y.S.2d 458, 465 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd 300 N.Y. 486, 88 N.E. 2d 720 (1949).
61. 4 N.Y.2d 518, 176 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1958).
62. 4 N.Y.2d 52, 172 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1958).
